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Abstract
The major cause of 1927’s so-called “Emetine Injection Incident” was the com-
pulsory administration of emetine injections instituted by the colonial Korean
sanitary police system, which aimed to create a hygienic environment for Kore-
ans in a cost-effective manner. Though some Koreans criticized this compulso-
ry police-administered treatment, this incident did not serve as a turning point
that led either to the improvement or abolishment of the sanitary police sys-
tem. After officially confirming that patients were poisoned, the Hanseong
Medical Association (HMA) did not try to use the incident as a chance to raise
their voice to improve the colonial medical system. Given that the aim of the
HMA was to benefit medical practitioners, intervening in administrative
actions may have laid outside its domain of interest. The HMA, as well as
other Korean political organizations, failed to harness the anger generated by
this incident to improve the sanitary environment in Korea. However, after the
risks of the injection were publicized, Koreans began to be suspicious of injec-
tions performed by the police. The Emetine Incident led Korean people to see
the sanitary policy of the colonial government from a different angle.
Keywords: distoma, emetine injection, Korean Western doctor, Hanseong
Medical Association (HMA), sanitary police system
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Introduction 
In March 1927, an unusual scene was witnessed by Koreans at Yeong-
heung, in the northernmost province of Hamgyeongnam-do. A raging
mob broke into the police station and smashed windows, desks, and
other furniture and equipment. The mob consisted of family mem-
bers of people who had died after being injected with emetine, a
treatment meant to prevent lung distoma. One, a father searching for
the doctor responsible, cried out “Who killed my only son?” while
brandishing a knife. The group looked so bloodthirsty that govern-
ment doctors who were supposed to be treating the injected refused
to go out without a police escort. However, even the police hesitated
to risk themselves. Once the incident was reported in the newspa-
pers, many Korean political organizations, such as the influential Sin-
ganhoe (“New Trunk Society”), began holding special meetings to
impeach the Japanese colonial government over the deaths. Immedi-
ately, the “Emetine Injection Incident” emerged as a burning national
issue. The press reported that all political organizations in Korea had
risen in arms to criticize government policies and discover the truth
for the people.1
Joseon bogeonsa (The History of Public Health in Korea) pub-
lished in 1981 not only had the incident resulted in a harsh spotlight
on brutal Japanese colonial policies, but it had also strengthened the
unity of Korean medical practitioners. Nevertheless, this campaign
failed to prevent the colonial government from continuing to admin-
ister the poisonous injection (Hong 1981, 337). Though I largely
agree with the first point, the second one fails to indicate what kind
of unity was achieved as an outcome. Furthermore, the author pro-
vides no clue as to why Koreans continued to receive the emetine
injections after the treatment had been demonstrated to be danger-
ous. To clarify these points, I shall ask and answer the following
questions. Why did this incident fail to change medical policy? Which
1. Dong-A Ilbo, March 23, March 24, March 25, 1927; Jungoe Ilbo, November 16,
1927. 
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medical doctors intervened at the time and how? Finally, what were
the consequences of this incident? I hope answers to these questions
will help provide a clearer picture of this incident.
The Discrepancy between a Deliberate Misdeed and 
Good Intention
After the annexation of Korea, the Japanese colonial government
exhibited great concern with regards to lung distoma and scarlet
fever. In 1916, it established the Institute for Contagious and Local
Diseases, affiliated with the Government-General Hospital, the central
hospital in Korea. The president of the hospital recalled that he want-
ed to eliminate lung distoma at all costs as it was a major pervasive
disease that devastated the Korean people, destroying them mentally
as well as physically. Lung distoma was responsible for decreased
labor productivity in families and was so widespread that it exerted a
debilitating influence throughout entire provinces and Korea as a
whole (Sato 1956, 72-73).2
The lung fluke, a parasitic worm approximately 8-12 mm long,
was known to cause human lung distoma. In 1915, a Japanese doctor
working in Taiwan determined that the crayfish or crab was the sec-
ond intermediate host (Moriyasu 1915, 31). No other cause or further
intermediate hosts had been discovered at that time. The main goal
of the institute was to conduct research on lung distoma and attempt
to begin its eradication. As research accumulated, the disease was
found to begin as the eggs of the lung fluke, which were transmitted
to black snails (the first intermediate host), or crayfish and crab (the
second intermediate host), before finally being ingested by and
infecting humans (Kobayashi 1927, 36). 
As the president of the Government-General Hospital was well
aware, lung distoma patients were quite common in Korea as to be
2. See also Chosen sotokuhu kampo (The Government-General’s Official Gazette),
January 9, 1912. 
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expected in light of the wide distribution of intermediate hosts. Cray-
fish could be found throughout Korea and crabs, if provided opportu-
nities to lay eggs, were active enough to reach remote areas like
Hamgyeongbuk-do province (Miyairi 1916, 57). The hosts alone were
not responsible for the widespread presence of lung distoma in
Korea. According to the colonial government, the Korean patients’
lack of health knowledge did not attempt to cure lung distoma, con-
sidered to be an untreatable chronic disease, thus resulting in a 80-
90 percent infection rate in some areas (Government-General in
Korea 1916, 324).3 One entire town was allegedly ruined by lung dis-
toma (Kobayashi 1929, 60). This high rate of infection seemed “horri-
fying” to the Japanese authorities (Nakano 1912, 49).
In addition to spurring epidemiologists to conduct further re-
search, the colonial government began to take practical measures
against the disease. The first step was eliminating human contact
with intermediate hosts. The colonial police urged residents, especial-
ly members of sanitary unions, to catch black snails which were the
first intermediate host. In 1916, the number of black snails caught
nationwide totaled approximately 210 million (Kagami 1916, 151).
The same type of mobilization was employed for crab catches, as
well. In Paju-gun in Gyeonggi-do province, residents were mobilized
to catch crabs for three days each month during the year of 1925.4
The next step was legislation, which outlasted the practical pre-
ventive measures. In 1922, the colonial government promulgated a
regulation on lung distoma to be applied to the three districts in
Hamgyeongbuk-do province that were regarded as the most severely
infected. The regulation specified that anyone who ate or sold crab
caught in these districts would be fined or sentenced to detention,
and that any medical practitioner who treated anyone suffering from
lung distoma should report the patient’s details to the police station
within three days.5 In 1924, to maximize the effect of these restric-
3. According to the survey conducted in 1916, there were 39,401 lung distoma infect-
ed patients in Korea (Government-General in Korea 1916, 320). 
4. Dong-A Ilbo, September 19, 1925. 
5. Chosen sotokuhu kampo, May 15, 1922. 
164 KOREA JOURNAL / SPRING 2010
tions, the Japanese colonial government expanded the regulation to
the whole of Korea.6 However, simple prevention was not enough to
eliminate lung distoma. Fortunately for the colonial government, a
Japanese doctor working in Manchuria discovered that injecting eme-
tine weakened the lung fluke and could work as a targeted treatment
for lung distoma. Exactly when the emetine injection was introduced
in Korea is uncertain, but had clearly taken place by the late 1910s
(Provisional Department of Land Survey 1918, 132). 
Emetine was regarded as an efficacious weapon in the battle
against lung distoma. The government offered it at cost as long as the
Korean patient showed a clear commitment to continuing the injec-
tions. In the case a patient could not afford the injection, the sanitary
union paid the bill.7 Some towns already had “cure unions” consist-
ing of lung distoma patients who received financial aid from the gov-
ernment.8 The government aimed to disburse the injections over as
large an area as possible. 
Between March 1st and 17th in 1927, the Bureau of Sanitation in
Hamgyeongbuk-do supervised the administration of emetine injec-
tions to about 100 infected residents of Yeongheung-gun. An unex-
pected result occurred a few days later, when about half of those
injected showed toxic symptoms, and six died. This triggered the
Yeongheung riot, stimulating negative feelings among Koreans
towards colonial policy nationwide. After hearing the news, several
young men’s associations in the province urged the authorities to dis-
close the facts and planned to hold a public rally in which the truth
about the incident could be reported.9 Many suspected that these
people had died of poisoning from the emetine injection. 
6. Chosen sotokuhu kampo, April 30, 1924. On 1st August, 1934, the colonial govern-
ment abolished the regulation, because cooking crab was verified as the most
effective measure to prevent lung distoma, and the nutritional benefits of cooked
crab would help farmers recover from weakened health due to the impoverished
conditions of farming communities (Government-General in Korea 1941, 156).
7. Chosun Ilbo, August 24, 1924. 
8. Maeil Sinbo, July 11, 1923. 
9. Dong-A Ilbo, March 22, 1927. 
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The official statement was disappointing to the Koreans, espe-
cially the family members of victims. After finishing the investiga-
tion, the colonial government defended itself from accusations that
patients had died of poisoning. According to police, just days after
residents were injected, the temperature fell rapidly and there was
heavy snowfall. This cold weather worsened the physical condition
of those injected who already had colds, to the extent that their colds
became acute pneumonia. This illness was pinpointed as the cause of
death. A Japanese doctor supported the claim by adding that no one
showed symptoms of poisoning, even though emetine injections had
been in use for several years.10 The officials assured the public that it
was not the emetine injection, but the weather that was to blame. 
However, patients continued to attribute the illness and ensuing
deaths to the emetine injections. The relatives of the victims claimed
that the authorities had deliberately given overdoses. In fact, the
emetine injection not only had limited value as treatment for dis-
toma, but also, if continued, side effects such as general weakening
and loss of appetite could appear. If such side effects became obvi-
ous, dosing should have ceased until the patient recovered (Provi-
sional Department of Land Survey 1918, 132). One of the doctors
administering injections admitted with some hesitation that if the res-
idents had been overdosed with emetine, they could have died as a
result. Although acknowledging that because the health states of the
patients varied widely, the dose of emetine had been increased to
three grams, the authorities continued to assert that deliberate over-
dosing was not feasible. They claimed that if there happened to be
some patients suffering from side effects, they would spontaneously
recover.11
Nevertheless, officials possibly administered stronger doses than
necessary, intending to maximize the effect of the injection. Korean
people in general had no liking for preventive injections, and authori-
ties should have informed residents fully about the details before giv-
10. Maeil Sinbo, March 23, 1927; Dong-A Ilbo, April 12, 1927. 
11. Dong-A Ilbo, March 23, March 24, 1927; Maeil Sinbo, March 23, 1927. 
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ing the injection and chosen only patients not suffering from other
health complications.12 In fact, to maximize the effect, officials rec-
ommended a daily injection unless a patient was in danger of suffer-
ing a heart attack. Continuing injections were recommended, even if
a patient was showing improvement to their health such as no longer
coughing up bloody phlegm, because emetine simply weakened 
the vitality of the fluke parasite rather than outright killing it. 
“The longer the injections are continued, the better the effect will be”
(Provisional Department of Land Survey 1918, 141). The greater the
efforts of the authorities to eradicate lung distoma, the higher the
possibility that the suffering of patients would be ignored.
Some circumstantial evidence supported patients’ claims of
abuse. A medical practitioner provided a newspaper with the story of
one person who was forced against his will to have the injection,
despite cries of pain. Furthermore, injected patients were threatened
with an injection fee that included previous injections if they stopped
the three-week course of injections. One of the government doctors
who participated in this treatment worried that the two- to three-gram
dose might be risky for patients, and asked the policeman concerned
to reconsider the level. The policeman ignored the doctor’s concerns,
telling him that the dosage had not caused any problems before.13
As criticism of the emetine injection spread nationwide, the chief
policeman in charge of Hamgyeongbuk-do province attempted to give
condolence money to pacify angered family members of the victims,
emphasizing that he gave the money not as chief policeman but as a
private individual, and that he promised to try to make amends and
impose punishment on the police concerned. At the same time, the
government sought to highlight the intentions rather than the results
of the treatment, and defended itself by saying that whether the offi-
cials had made a mistake or not, there was no doubt that they had
been motivated entirely by good intentions.14 
12. Maeil Sinbo, March 23, 1927; Chosun Ilbo, April 2, 1924. 
13. Dong-A Ilbo, March 22, 1927; Chosun Ilbo, March 25, 1927. 
14. Dong-A Ilbo, March 25, April 12, 1927; Chosun Ilbo, March 25, 1927. 
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The Intervention of Professionals and Their Limitations 
Arguments over the real cause of death continued between family
members of victims and the authorities. The Organization for the
Yeongheung Incident, consisting of members from most major
nationalist organizations in Korea, asked the Hanseong (Seoul) Med-
ical Association (HMA), an organization of Korean doctors trained in
Western medicine, to dispatch medical practitioners to attempt to
deal with the disaster.15 Following the colonization of Korea, there
was only one countrywide medical association, called the Chosen
Medical Association, whose management and memberships were pri-
marily Japanese medical doctors. The HMA was regarded by most
Korean people as the “Korean” Medical Association. Koreans expect-
ed that the HMA would support their side in the dispute. It was time
for professionals to intervene. 
Seeking the intervention of Western-trained medical doctors
might be interpreted as recognition of their rising status. Oriental
medicine had been the traditional form of practice in Korea for sever-
al thousand years, and the number of oriental medical doctors was
three times larger than that of Western-trained medical doctors.16
Korean traditional medicine presumably recognized the existence of
lung distoma. Dongui bogam (Exemplar of Korean Medicine), the
early seventeenth-century Korean traditional medical text, referred to
pyechung or lung worms that resembled silkworms as causing cough-
ing in humans. Compared to descriptions of other worms, the descrip-
tion on pyechung seems particularly detailed (Yeo 1993, 116).17 Con-
sidering that the officially surveyed number of lung distoma patients
was about 40,000 in 1916, and that lung distoma was conventionally
called “tojil” or endemic in Korea (S. Kobayasi 1929, 60), oriental
medicine must have had some kind of remedy for lung distoma.
15. Dong-A Ilbo, March 27, 1927. 
16. In 1927, there were 1,508 Western-style medical practitioners, and 4,289 oriental
medicine doctors. 
17. A Japanese medical doctor supposed that in oriental medicine, lung distoma was
probably categorized as a disease which caused bloody phlegm (Miki 1963, 90). 
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However, oriental medicine had not identified an etiological
cause. Furthermore, it was regarded by the Japanese colonial govern-
ment as “primitive,” “uncivilized,” and “unscientific” medicine.
Korean Western-trained doctors mostly shared the opinion of colonial
government in this matter. Even Korean Western-trained doctors who
supported the oriental medicine revival did not accept some of the
underlying theories of oriental medicine, especially the Five Elements
theory (Yeo 2008, 93-102). This evaluation probably influenced the
decision to dispatch Western-trained medical doctors; the fight
against “scientific” authority needed weapons forged by “science.”
According to an editorial in a Korean newspaper, the truth had to be
revealed in genuinely scientific terms.18 Science was a term which
was generally regarded as rooted in Western civilization. According-
ly, a Western medical doctor, rather than traditional one, was needed
to investigate the incident. 
In fact, Korean Western-trained doctors were already involved in
the investigation prior to this intervention. When reports of the inci-
dent were first published in newspapers, articles by Korean medical
practitioners had already appeared, expressing doubt over the colo-
nial government’s explanation. They suspected that this incident
originated from an overdose of emetine. They added that because
emetine was a poisonous medication, the person administering
should examine the patient’s physical state every time the injection is
given, taking extreme care even when treating otherwise healthy peo-
ple. If already poisoned patients were continually injected with eme-
tine, their condition could quickly lead to death. The dose of emetine
should not exceed two grams, with one gram the standard. However,
the practitioners suspected that those giving the injections had not
paid much intention to the physical condition of those they were try-
ing to treat.19
The HMA dispatched two members of its association to Yeong-
heung in response. The HMA representatives expressed considerable
18. Chosun Ilbo, April 2, 1927. 
19. Dong-A Ilbo, March 22, 1927; Chosun Ilbo, March 25, 1927. 
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doubt regarding the colonial government’s official statement. One
said:
I have never seen a patient showing such eccentric symptoms.
Research papers on such symptoms have not been published. Even
though we recognize the argument that the genuine cause of death
originated with a cold, it is unlikely that only emetine-injected
patients caught such a bizarre cold. Conclusively, I could not help
but conclude that the patients were poisoned by emetine injection.20 
Following accounts of the incident from their representatives, the
HMA issued an official statement: “After conducting clinical experi-
ments on patients, we have reached the conclusion that they clearly
showed symptoms of toxic poisoning.” The HMA added that if neces-
sary, they had every intention of publishing the result in an academic
paper.21 At last, “science” supported the Korean victims.
There can be little doubt that the members of HMA were a new
generation, constantly influenced by ideas of the superiority of West-
ern medicine. It was Japan itself who stressed this superiority more
than anyone else. Subsequent to the annexation of Korea, Japan
harnessed Western civilization to justify its colonial rule, arguing
the West was superior to the East in terms of civilization and that
Korea should modernize itself with the help of Japan, who had
already achieved this goal. Absorbing Western civilization through
Japan, especially medicine, was proffered as one of the most impor-
tant achievements to which Korea could aspire (Park 2006, 200-205).
As far as this incident was concerned, the new generation contra-
dicted the current and previous “science teacher,” that is, Japan.22
20. Dong-A Ilbo, March 30, 1927. 
21. On 9th April, the fact that the patients had been poisoned was officially confirmed
again by the Korean doctors dispatched from the Hamnam Medical Association,
consisting of medical practitioners from the affected Hamgyeongnam-do province
(Chosun Ilbo, April 14, 1927). 
22. In 1899 Korean government established a governmental medical school in which
Western medicine was taught by a Japanese doctor, which continued until the end
of colonial rule (Kee 1995, 127-159).
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According to the scientific standards of Korean doctors, the colonial
government’s statement was not satisfactory. Neither the colonial
administration’s fairness nor expertise was trusted by Korean doctors
from the outset of the incident. A Korean doctor suspected the exper-
tise of the official doctors concerned and said, “Judging from the fact
that public doctors used more than three times the dose of emetine,
there is little doubt that they did not have any knowledge of emetine
injection.”23 The interviews with Western-style medical doctors clear-
ly revealed the development of Korean doctors and their role within
Korean society. 
At the same time, the colonial government was confronting diffi-
cult circumstances. The incident took place in 1927, when yearnings
for independence were regaining strength in Korea. Singanhoe was a
threat to the colonial regime, because it implicitly and explicitly
aimed to achieve national independence through unification of the
nation. Most topics at meetings held by the Singanhoe society advo-
cated national unity (Yi 1993, 287). Upon hearing the news from
Yeongheung, several national organizations decided to ask Singanhoe
to dispatch a representative to investigate the situation.24 Singanhoe
was expected to play a leading role in this incident.
This incident was potentially quite politically useful for Korean
nationalist organizations as an example of innocent Koreans being
killed by the coercive Japanese colonial government. The incident
gave the HMA an opportunity to take a leadership role by demon-
strating its nationalist credentials as well as its expertise. As far as
this incident was concerned, Koreans regarded the HMA to be repre-
senting Korea in the same manner as Singanhoe, because the Organi-
zation for Yeongheung Incident had asked the HMA to dispatch rep-
resentatives. The representative sent by Singanhoe was treated for all
intents and purposes as official Korean investigators, charged with
23. Dong-A Ilbo, March 25, 1927. Though the public doctors concerned were Korean
as well as Japanese, ultimate responsibility rested with the Japanese colonial gov-
ernment. In this sense, it was the colonial government whom Korean medical doc-
tors blamed. 
24. Dong-A Ilbo, March 27, 1927. 
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meeting and questioning the Japanese officials concerned.25
However, the HMA took no further action except to announce
the results of their investigation. Their reluctance to participate in
policy making possibly deprived them of an opportunity to become
national leaders of Korea. Socially elevated, doctors did not want to
risk being at the head of a nationalist movement because they
believed that working in the field of medicine, improving the public
health environment, or providing new medical treatments to the pub-
lic was sufficient to fulfill their obligations to the nation. Resolving a
national crisis was not considered to be part of their role (Kim 1933,
1). They wanted to take a limited role by enlightening people, rather
than act as national leaders.
At the same time, as long as scientific measures were at the heart
of the issue, there was not much the HMA could do, as it was obvi-
ous that there was no better cure for lung distoma than emetine
injection. The efficacy of the injection was generally acknowledged,
even by Korean doctors. A distinguished Korean medical doctor
admitted that emetine injection not only cured lung distoma but also
prevented the disease from spreading (Yu 1931, 34). It was difficult
for Korean doctors to draw distinctions between colonial government
and themselves when they themselves endorsed emetine injection as
the most practical method to eradicate lung distoma.
However, the refusal of HMA to accept the colonial government’s
assertion seemed to effectively undermine the credibility of the gov-
ernment. The colonial government no longer claimed that this inci-
dent took place as a result of a sudden drop in temperature, but
declared, “We have not found any specific cause of toxication.”26
What was worse for the colonial government, a nearly identical inci-
dent took place in Haenam, Jeollanam-do province, which similarly
struggled with widespread lung distoma. Six residents out of 50 who
received the injection were reported to have died. According to
Chosun Ilbo, injections continued to be administered, even to a patient
25. Chosun Ilbo, March 27, March 31, 1927. 
26. Chosun Ilbo, April 2, 1927.
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who was forced to rest at home because of severe side effects.27
At the same time, the HMA’s confirmation spurred nationalistic
organizations to criticize the government with more confidence.
“Thanks to the HMA’s confirmation, it is obvious that the cause of
death is the injection of poisonous emetine.”28 The authorities were
alleged to have deliberately concealed the true cause of death by
feigning that influenza or pneumonia caused the deaths. These orga-
nizations demanded that the government punish the officials con-
cerned and generously reimburse the victims’ families for damages,
citing mistakes that led to the incident and accusing the authorities of
being intentionally misleading in stating that the victims died of
pneumonia.29 
As the clinical cause of death was revealed, it was time to dis-
close the fundamental cause that had such significant consequences.
One of the causes pointed out at the time was discrimination against
Koreans. Despite the fact that a dose of more than one gram of eme-
tine could result in poisoning, the officials neglected to appraise the
health status of each individual before treatment. The Organization
for Yeongheung Incident claimed that this indicated that the colonial
government did not value the lives of Koreans.30 If the authorities
had been sincere in their efforts to take care of the Korean people,
such incidents would not happen. Without people’s belief in a 
government, it was claimed, no state power could succeed in ruling
people.31
Other Koreans identified the sanitary police system as the main
culprit. The sanitary police system was established in 1911, after the
27. Dong-A Ilbo, April 1, 1927.
28. Dong-A Ilbo, April 9, 1927. 
29. Chosun Ilbo, April 24, 1927. Since the authorities did not provide any financial
compensation, one victims’ widow demanded 10,000 won from the officials con-
cerned, including public doctors, since nobody in her family was able to earn
money since her husband had died as a result of the emetine injection (Jungoe
Ilbo, March 22, 1928). 
30. Chosun Ilbo, April 6, 1927; Dong-A Ilbo, April 13, 1927. 
31. Sinmin (New People) 24 (1927): p. 3.
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abolition of the Bureau of Sanitation within the Ministry of Internal
Affairs. According to one newspaper editorial, it was shocking that
this kind of incident took place in a country ruled by Japan, which
was arguably one of the advanced nations in terms of medical knowl-
edge and treatment. Therefore, the colonial police administration was
to be blamed because, although public doctors had given the injec-
tions, the police department had supervised the whole process. One
doctor involved admitted that he differentiated doses for each indi-
vidual patient, following the orders of the policeman in charge.32 
The editorial writer could not understand how the colonial gov-
ernment permitted police to give clinically unproven injections to
more than 100 people. Some contended that the police ignored the
state of Korean public health and living standards.33 Critics of the san-
itary police system noted that the police lacked medical knowledge,
possessing no more than ordinary people.34 A Korean medical practi-
tioner joining the investigation with the representatives of HMA stated
that in his opinion, patients clearly received excessively strong doses
of emetine and that public doctors did not monitor patients’ health
during the injection period.35 Though aware that this incident did not
occur as a result of a sinister move on the part of the authorities, he
asserted there was no doubt that local police lacked proper considera-
tion for the condition of the Korean people’s health.36 
As criticism of the colonial administration grew, with the police
singled out for particular condemnation, a prosecutor was dispatched
to investigate public doctors, family members of victims, and other
witnesses. A doctor in the Government-General Hospital was even
sent to carry out a post-mortem. However, the results of the autopsy
were kept secret by the government, which was interpreted as a fail-
ure to contradict the so-called toxication theory.37 About a year later,
32. Dong-A Ilbo, March 24, 1927. 
33. Dong-A Ilbo, March 22, 1927. 
34. Keimuiho (The Police Bulletin) 213 (1923): p. 71. 
35. Dong-A Ilbo, April 2, 1927.
36. Chosun Ilbo, April 17, 1927. 
37. Chosun Ilbo, March 30, April 1, April 3, April 6, 1927. 
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a local Hamgyeongnam-do provincial congressman demanded that
the authorities reveal the full truth to dispel suspicions, stressing that
concealing the truth would only aggravate the situation. However, a
policeman attending the local congress just reiterated previous excus-
es that the incident was classified as top secret.38 
To pacify public opinion, the government announced that it was
ceasing emetine injections from April 1927.39 However, a 1931 news-
paper article announced that emetine injections were to be given to
all local residents for the complete elimination of lung distoma.40
This resumption was probably inevitable. Except for a prohibition
against catching crabs, there was no practical way to end the spread
of lung distoma. As such, emetine injection was the best-known
method to cure distoma. While opposition was spreading, even critics
admitted that Japanese medicine was “top class” and emetine injec-
tion was “an advanced and civilized medicine.”41 Emetine injection
was one of the most effective medicines that “scientific” Japanese
medicine possessed during the colonial period. The authority’s affec-
tion for emetine injection was not weakened.42 
Conclusion 
The HMA, as well as other Korean political organizations, failed to
harness the 1927 Emetine Injection Incident to improve the Korean
situation. However, after the dangers of the injection were publi-
cized, Koreans began to be suspicious of injections performed by
38. Chosun Ilbo, February 28, 1928. 
39. Chosun Ilbo, April 2, 1927. 
40. Chosun Ilbo, November 20, 1931. 
41. Dong-A Ilbo, March 22, 1927; Sinmin (New People) 24 (1927): p. 3.
42. Chosun Ilbo, April 28, 1927. The first thing the authorities had to do to eliminate
distoma seems to have been providing sanitary facilities such as water supply sys-
tem. In 1936, a survey showed that only 2 out of 58 Yeongheung residents suffered
from distoma. Such astonishing improvement, according to newspapers, resulted
from “serving ample drinking water through the water supply system” (Maeil
Sinbo, July 9, 1936). 
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police. Similar suspicions arose around scarlet fever injections, in
another example of Koreans rejecting colonial medicine. While about
80 percent of elementary school students voluntarily accepted a pre-
ventive injection against scarlet fever in Seoul, seven of the fifteen
infected patients were revealed to have been injected the previous
year. This figure rendered suspect the preventive injections. Even
though the authorities defended themselves by saying that immunity
was effective for one year, “the injection was in grave doubt.”43
In the end, it would be fair to say that the major cause of this
incident was the compulsory administration of emetine injections,
originating from the colonial Korean sanitary police system, which
aimed to create a hygienic environment for Koreans without spend-
ing much effort or money. Though some Koreans criticized the com-
pulsory treatment, this incident did not serve as a milestone in the
improvement of the sanitary police system or its abolishment. 
Political organizations leading the movement against emetine
injections focused their interests on more nationalistic agendas such as
the independence movement. Considering that the first National United
Front in Korea was organized in 1927, when the incident took place,
hygienic problems were probably not of great concern to Korean politi-
cal organizations. At the same time, the HMA did not try to use the
incident as a chance to raise their voice to improve the colonial med-
ical system. They had little experience in such activities, and believed
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